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The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the endangered status of the concept of 
citizenship. The methodology employed consists of textual analysis and philosophical 
argumentation. The main findings of the paper are: 
(1) The boundary of the meaning of citizenship keeps changing. 
(2) Citizenship constitutes one of the most worrisome sources of conflict in modern states. 
(3) There is no objectively correct interpretation of citizenship, both in its historical and 
contemporary understanding. 
The conclusion drawn from the findings is that various factors, especially the multicultural 
character of most contemporary societies, are impinging on the possibility of developing a 
theory of citizenship that is universally applicable and globally acceptable. 
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Introduction 
The history of modern philosophical ideas owes a lot to Rene Descartes’ declaration  that true 
knowledge must entail certainty, clarity and indubitability. It is to this end that Descartes 
formulated rules of reasoning, with the first stating that we should never accept anything as 
true which is not known to be such; that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and 
prejudice, and to comprise nothing more in our judgment than what was presented to our 
mind so clearly as to exclude all ground of doubt (Descartes 2008, 21). Epistemologically, 
any claim that is open to doubt stands the risk of being excluded from knowledge regardless 
of its cultural popularity. This is contrary to the view of Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984) that we 
live in the post-modern age where relativity, plurality and difference constitute the acme test 
of truth. This notwithstanding, modernism believes that any idea which generates doubt 
should be discarded and should, in the language of Harold Laski (1979), be thrown into the 
dustbin. It follows, at least to a point, that to be theoretically true is to be practically 
compliant. But in what sense can the Cartesian approach be adopted in relation to 
citizenship? 
There is some skepticism over what exactly modern ideas about citizenship are. According to 
Engin Isin (2002, 1), within the context of the modern project alone, two major traditions 
seem to assert their dominance, namely, orientalism and synoecism. The controversies raised 
by these two traditions have created many other positions, such that the boundary of 
citizenship keeps shifting. Recent radical examples are captured in postmodern, libertarian 
and communitarian conceptions of citizenship, with the feminist critique of traditional and 
modern conceptions of citizenship constituting an appreciable percentage of contemporary 
literature on the issue. What is more, from a woman-centered perspective, feminist thought 
on citizenship is not monolithic: there are liberals, Marxists, postmodernists, radicals etc. 
The deluge of controversies over citizenship compels me to argue that citizenship is an 
endangered concept. To accomplish this, I have divided the paper into two main sections: the 
first is devoted to a brief analysis of the meaning and cultural significance of the concept of 
citizenship; the second examines reasons why citizenship appears endangered, adducing four 
grounds for this conclusion - arguments from meaning, the state, multiculturalism and 
equality. 
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Citizenship: between Popularity and Paradox 
We live at a time when talk about citizenship is rife, and when demands for citizenship rights 
are strategically influential in relation to policy formulation. In fact, scholars interested in 
democratization, especially in Africa, Latin America and Asia, are particularly armed with 
rhetoric to the effect that citizenship is a sine qua non of democracy. Furthermore, the 
perceived connection between citizenship and education has added to the popularity of the 
concept of citizenship, with literacy rights being said to embody citizenship rights. Indeed, 
citizenship has been one of the most popular concepts in socio-political philosophy over the 
last sixty years or so. In his celebrated work, Citizenship and Social Class, Marshall (1950) 
provided a restricted categorization of the elements of citizenship into civil, political and 
social rights. However, Environmentalists contend that environmental rights are not only 
important for development and justice, but are third generation entitlements with substantial 
impact on the survival of the entire universe. 
Galston (1991) proclaimed that liberal democracy is founded on citizenship. What is more, 
Putnam (1993) postulated citizenship as the ‘social capital’ on which developing democracy 
rests. For Fraser and Gordon (1994), citizenship speaks of respect, rights and dignity. 
According to Kymlicka and Norman (2000, 30-31), four main ideas explain the nature of 
citizenship: status as a legal person, a sense of identity, a sense of civic virtue and activity, 
and a sense of cohesion. Furthermore, Kymlicka and Norman (2000) contended that there is 
need to develop a theory of citizenship which accommodates diverse cultural groups. 
However, as we shall show presently, their arguments do not seem to take care of the 
debilitating effects of diversity on citizenship. 
The challenge to citizenship theorists is how to ensure the existence of what William Galston 
(1991) calls responsible citizenship, or what Stephen Macedo (1990) refers to as the virtue of 
public reasonableness. Yet even over these issues scholars are divided: one camp prefers a 
vote-centric conception of citizenship (Mansbridge 2000), while the other advocates for a 
voice-centric approach (Chambers 1998). These conflicting opinions, as illuminating as they 
appear, tend to stifle the possibility of creating a synthesized view of what citizenship theory 
should be. Thus While many of the ideas associated with citizenship are laudable, they do not 
remove the semantic and logical confusion created over the theory of citizenship. In effect, 
the epistemological usefulness of the concept of citizenship is put to doubt on account of the 
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many confusing perspectives on its meaning. Below we examine three major challenges to a 
coherent and universally applicable theory of citizenship. 
Citizenship and Conceptual Difficulties 
The word ‘citizenship’, just like the word ‘law’, seems to have a set of theoretical meanings 
different from its meanings in the practical sense. It follows that the same word has two or 
more meanings, without any sense of coherence among them: the realm of theory is held to 
be different from the realm of practice, just as much as the purview of the normative does not 
exactly coincide with that of the descriptive. In other words, citizenship is said to connote a 
status that is normative as well as descriptive. Yet it is difficult to see how the same concept 
can be normative and non-normative, prescriptive and descriptive at the same time. More 
importantly, it is in the world of theoretical analysis and conceptual characterization that the 
concept seems to derive its lingering uncertainties and unending confusions. The fundamental 
problem with the characterization of citizenship consists in finding the appropriate theoretical 
clue that coincides with practice. 
The first conceptual problem presented by citizenship is that its meaning is contestable. This 
explains the several meanings of citizenship. In my opinion, it is this multiplicity of meanings 
which makes citizenship endangered. Citizenship does not have a universally acceptable 
definition. One reason for this is that its meaning is parasitic in nature. We cannot define 
what citizenship means without making use of some other concept. For example, Marshall 
(1950) defines citizenship using the concept of right; but right is different from citizenship. 
As the parasitic concept that it is, citizenship relies on other notions. It alludes to certain other 
concepts as useful clues in its definition despite the fact that those other concepts are 
themselves very problematic. Notions such as democracy, participation, equality, liberty, 
freedom and rights are some of the concepts that are alluded to in defining citizenship. 
Consequently, one is compelled to believe that the idea of citizenship conjures a false picture 
of reality, or that it does not exist at all. 
The second conceptual problem is that the notion of citizenship is recursive in nature. W.B. 
Gallie (1968) wrote that citizenship is an essentially contested concept, with its meanings 
having always emerged in disputed and recursive use. Some of the recursive concepts 
attached to citizenship are community, membership, participation and rights. For example, 
what is the meaning of membership, or community or political participation? Does it mean 
citizenship cannot be defined outside these concepts? This is why Rose (1999) asserted that 
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citizenship has a recursive character since it relies on difficult concepts to establish its 
epistemological and empirical significance. According to Rose (1999, 177), this is a kind of a 
birth-to-presence of a form of being which pre-exists the conditions of its re-inventions. This 
is what necessitated the warning of White and Donoghue (2002, 2) that as long as the 
meaning of citizenship is entrapped in a form of dependence on words and terms such as 
‘membership’, ‘participation’ and ‘community’, what it means must remain uncertain, 
doubtful, and an impossible concept, theoretically. 
Another challenge has to do with the problem of cultural diversity and the varied experiences 
of different political societies on what citizenship means. For example, Pieter Boele van 
Hensbroek (2007) stated that citizenship cannot be given the same meaning in societies with 
different state histories and struggles about power, different issues of hierarchy etc. In other 
words, the meaning of citizenship is influenced by the cultural ethos in question. Each society 
constructs the language and logic of citizenship in line with its own history and experiences. 
How possible, then, is it to build a common theory of citizenship in the face of dissimilar 
experiential and cultural logic? There would not be a universal theoretical paradigm to 
support such a venture.1 This is why Peter Ekeh (1975) reasoned that to claim a kind of 
symmetry on the nature of citizenship in different states and societies would be to be guilty of 
academic suicide and cultural amnesia. In his words, “the political problems of the age as 
well as the historical context of politics determine to a large extent the aspects and issues of 
citizenship that are sorted out for emphasis in a given society.” 
T.H. Marshall, regarded as one of the ablest exponents of the theory of citizenship, actually 
anticipated the likely difficulties of insisting on the search for a universal theory. In his 
words, “citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All 
who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is 
endowed. There is no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be 
…” (Marshall 1950, 20-29). Marshall not only vacillated, but also resorted to the use of 
recursive concepts such as equality, membership and community to define citizenship. Is 
citizenship primarily a concern with status or an obsession with rights? Which one is 
                                                
1 This, according to Solomon and Higgins (1996, 191-192), explains the heart of the major problem that 
inundated the dream of a common and universal citizenship that the Enlightenment thinkers entertained during 
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. 
150 Idowu William 
ontologically and epistemologically prior - full membership in a society before being a 
citizen, or being a citizen which creates the privilege of full membership? The implications 
are far reaching, and are likely to cause conceptual convulsion in relation to theory making. 
Yet another dimension of the difficulty ingrained in citizenship is what I have called the 
disparity between a type of exaggeration of what citizenship historically means, and the 
contemporary reality that essentially contradicts the exaggeration encoded in that historicity. 
Etymologically, I suppose, the concept of citizenship has its origins among the ancient Greek 
thinkers and, later on, among the Roman jurists. However, to assiduously fasten our 
conception of citizenship to that historical beginning is to undermine the in-built dynamism 
that the concept itself seems to have. It is to uphold a very static apparatus in the assessment 
of a concept, and a philosophical concept for that matter. As Turner (1990, 202) has noted, it 
would be wrong to imagine that the notion of citizenship actually remains static down 
through history. 
Each age develops problems that are peculiar to it, and manages them from a perspective that 
is consistent with the mentality and logic of that age. It is the idealism that is encoded in an 
exaggerated historicity, an idealism that is seeking for ways by which its usefulness for this 
age can be transferred, that is primarily responsible for the problem of conceptualization in 
which citizenship is muddled today, and which is affecting the conceptual possibilities 
available for the understanding of citizenship presently. Will Kymlicka appears to have a 
lucid understanding of this problem: 
… most western political theorists have operated with an idealized model of 
the polis in which fellow citizens share a common descent, language, and 
culture. Even when the theorists themselves lived in polyglot empires that 
governed numerous ethnic and linguistic groups, they have often written as if 
the culturally homogenous city-states of Ancient Greece provided the essential 
or standard model of a political community (Kymlicka 1995, 2).  
 
Even the evolution of the term ‘citizen’ created and still creates a sense of difficulty 
concerning the meaning of citizenship. Who is a citizen, and over what and where is her 
status important? We must admit that the root of the word has a strictly western origin, but 
that is not the problem. Besides, in terms of language, many different words have been used 
to designate the true and tested etymology of the term ‘citizen’. This is why if one probes 
Kymlicka’s observation, one is bound to disagree with his assertion that the standard problem 
of many political theorists over the idea of citizenship is the propensity to idealize the ancient 
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Greek understanding of political community as reiterated in classical Greek thought.  The real 
problem is that of neglecting the complex and ambiguous but interesting semantic, linguistic 
and cultural history of the term ‘citizen’ even within the context of western tradition. 
The term ‘citizen’ as adopted in the English lexicon has medieval roots, and its original 
meaning is grounded in the idea of the City. According to Downing (1988, 9), the inhabitants 
of a city were regarded as citizens, while those outside were regarded as subjects. In the same 
vein, J.J. Rousseau (1973, 175) argued that houses make a town, but citizens make a city. If 
this analysis is correct, it means that the way citizenship is currently used is actually 
misleading. Thus there is need for a change of name from citizenship. The zen may be 
retained in the new term, but the citi would have to be jettisoned. Consequently, these 
conceptual difficulties indicate that citizenship is, indeed, an endangered concept. The 
celebrated view of Turner (1990, 203) that the concept of city, deriving from this etymology, 
is extensive and continuous does not seem to bear strong resemblance with history, nor does 
it conform to the internal logic of the term. 
Citizenship and the State 
The argument from the state constitutes the second reason for contending that citizenship is 
endangered. The common headline in seasoned analyses of citizenship revolves around the 
state: this is the statist tradition of citizenship. However, this tradition has not been careful 
enough to understand that the entity called the state is a mere abstraction, which means that 
the idea of citizenship itself is a mere abstraction, and as such, without an empirical 
instantiation. Unless and except the physicality and empirical nature of the state is proven, 
there is no way by which the idea of citizenship can be rescued from the abyss of redundancy 
with which the abstract nature of the state has confined it. Besides, unless and until a more 
general theory of citizenship is developed such that it is no longer tied to the apron strings of 
the state, we cannot have a genuine concept of citizenship. 
What the state generally refers to has been a subject of controversy, keeping the concept of 
the state itself entrapped. It is therefore not surprising that Dyson (1980) notes that the state is 
a contested concept and, therefore, involves problems of meaning and application. Andrew 
Vincent’s (1987) compendious treatment of the theories of the state, though a thorough 
analysis of the concept of the state, is only historical rather than conceptual. This is because it 
fails to synthesize the normative character of the state. It is in connection with this intellectual 
puzzle concerning the state-concept that Bosanquet posited: 
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In a certain sense it would be true to say that wherever men have lived there 
has always been a “State.” That is to say, there has been some association or 
corporation, larger than the family, and acknowledging no power superior to 
itself. But it is obvious that the experience of a State in this general sense of 
the word is not coextensive with true political experience, and that something 
much more definite than this is necessary to awaken curiosity as to the nature 
and value of the community in which man finds himself to be a member 
(Bosanquet 2001, 19). 
 
It is the absence of such complementariness between our abstract theory and political 
experiences that has generated skeptical conclusions on the state. This is why some scholars 
contend that, perhaps, what is necessary to prove the validity of an existent entity that could, 
in the general sense, be called a state is the change of terminology, referentially, in place of 
the state-concept. An example is Cole (1920, 86), who suggested that it is better to replace the 
state-concept with that of a government-concept. Laski (1919, 30), also contended that “state 
action is, in actual fact, action by the government.” 
As a matter of fact, some scholars are confident of the fact that what we naturally consider to 
be the state is a non-existent entity. In Berki’s language, what we call the state is a rather 
baffling phenomenon (Berki 1989, 12). On his part, Michel Foucault considers the state to be a 
mythicised abstraction: “… the state, no more probably than at any other time in its history, 
does not have this unity, this individuality, this rigorous functionality, nor to speak frankly, this 
importance: may be after all the state is no more than a composite reality and a mythicised 
abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think” (Foucault 1991, 
103). 
The worrisome aspect of this assessment of the state-centric tradition is not just because it is 
abstract: some abstract entities still evoke a sense of utility and importance in empirical 
terms.2 What is worrisome is Foucault’s sentencing of the state to the abyss of mysticism and 
mythicism. This is perhaps a more incommodious charge, and it means that we should not 
                                                
2 For example, numbers are abstract but the Pythagoreans consider numbers as the principle of the order and 
nature of the universe. Even mathematics and science will turn out to be a gravely impossible academic 
engagement without numbers. The meaning is that numbers, though abstract, are actually of scientific 
importance disregarding their abstract nature. 
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expect any epistemological comfort in an attempt at analyzing, in concrete, empirical terms, 
the science of the state. 
Despite this skeptical attitude concerning the state, the importance of citizenship is still 
attached to the state. Just what the state is to citizenship, from this skeptical perspective, 
explains the heart of the confusion over the controversial conceptualization of citizenship. 
This also lends credence to the claim that, despite its popularity in our age, citizenship is an 
endangered concept. If the state is denied existence, how then can we make sense of a 
concept that is etymologically and pragmatically attached to it? This nexus between state and 
citizenship considerably informs the position that citizenship is becoming an endangered 
concept. 
Citizenship and Multiculturalism 
My third argument for the endangered status of citizenship rests on the idea of 
multiculturalism. According to Femi Taiwo (1996, 16), “part of what typifies citizenship 
especially in the modern state is the de-emphasizing of geography and other natural facts in 
its composition.” It follows that the very presence of natural facts indicates the threatened 
nature of citizenship in the world today. The nature of my worry can be insightfully gleaned 
from Kymlicka’s observation about the connection between citizenship and multiculturalism: 
“In very few countries,” says Kymlicka (1995, 1), “can the citizens be said to share the same 
language, or belong to the same ethnonational group”. This explains the depth of the malaise 
with which the concept of citizenship in multicultural societies is confronted. 
There are many issues to note from what Kymlicka opined as stated above. First, it is 
apparent that the equality that citizenship promises is bound to be defective, problematic or 
may not even exist at all. This is due to the fact that each of the ethno national and linguistic 
groups in a polity may have very dissimilar perceptions and conceptions of politics. As a 
result, conceptions of principles of equality and liberty and other such revered political 
principles with strong philosophical implications would not be seen to have the same 
meanings. Such relativism often constitutes the basis of inter-cultural antagonism,. 
Second, the conception of citizenship that will be prominent in countries where the citizens 
do not share ethnicity, language and culture will be curious and unsound in nature. In other 
words, such a conception will be contrary to the very nature of what the ancient greeks 
understood the idea of citizenship to be. We are not contending that disagreements are absent 
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in culturally homogenous societies, but that the obvious differences that are found in 
heterogeneous societies render the idea of citizenship endangered. There is, however, two 
dimensions to this: the national and the global. 
In the first instance, the nation-state conception of citizenship is, in the world today, 
threatened by ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic pluralism. It is important that the 
problem is stated very clearly: democratic survival in most countries of the world today is 
experiencing huge challenges arising from the plural nature of contemporary societies. Yet 
plurality is actually not the problem, but rather the attitudes that are expressed concerning 
various identities. What is worrisome is the politicization of our identities and differences. 
This is true both of democracy and of citizenship, as the two concepts have a crucial 
relationship. 
One aspect of contemporary multi-cultural states that challenges the concept of citizenship 
pertains to the question of minorities. Writing on the experiences of most Asian countries, 
Weiner noted: 
In country after country, a single ethnic group has taken over the control over 
the state and used its powers to exercise control over others. In retrospect there 
has been far less “nation-building” than many analysts had expected or hoped, 
for the process of state-building has rendered many ethnic groups devoid of 
power and influence (Weiner 1987, 23). 
 
Thus based on Weiner’s analysis, as much as democracy is threatened, citizenship is equally 
threatened. Conversely, the threats to citizenship are exactly the same as those to democratic 
survival. 
The global dimension is occasioned by forces such as globalization and global migration, that 
inhibit the development of a precise conceptualization of citizenship. One negative effect of 
migration on citizenship is that it (migration) leads to the development of new conceptions of 
national citizenship. This creates false impressions about a possible notion of global 
citizenship. The implications are manifest: 
(1) There is enough room for the unfiltered advancement of the capitalists’ ideology in favour 
of some countries to the discomfiture of others. 
(2) The tendency to maintain the servant-master relationship in the global hegemonic 
network. 
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Furthermore, the study by Rainer Baubock et. Al. (2006) is a very systematic and painstaking 
underscoring of the connection between citizenship and migration. In the well crafted 
introduction, Baubock provides a very disturbing insight into some of the conflicting 
perceptions that arise on account of the migration-citizenship nexus, some of which are the 
conflict between policies that support migrants on account of the desire for assimilation and 
the unmitigated demand for naturalization benefits on the part of migrants, with an emphasis 
on rights which is not accompanied by duties. Another is conflicting loyalties on the part of 
migrants to their host nations on the one hand, and to their countries of origin on the other. 
Citizenship and the Paradox of Equality 
Central to the concept of citizenship is the idea that it legitimizes a value system whose major 
goal is equality. This occurs both at the level of abstraction and in societies where it is 
ingrained as a running culture. However, this seems to point to a dilemma: if citizenship is 
intended to address inequality in the world, then there is currently no equality in the world; if 
there is equality in the world, then citizenship is not needed after all. Yet the fact is that the 
idea of citizenship arose in response to the disturbing reality of inequality in the world. In 
Third World countries, people often look to citizenship to institutionalize equality. Yet 
equality is far from being realized. Indeed, there are not only gross injustices in the world, but 
also gaping inequalities that translate into inequities. Thus the equality which is believed to 
be achievable through the system of citizenship is no where to be found. This absence not 
only creates unending conflicts, but it is also a compelling ground for our view that 
citizenship is an endangered concept. Nevertheless, the paradox of the modern age is that the 
very concept which promises equality in almost every political community is not only a very 
popular one, but also one through which systems of democracy are judged. 
Historically, the first radical move towards equality was expressed in the demands of the 
French Revolution for liberty, equality and fraternity. Apart from being a contested concept, 
citizenship has actually been a very difficult normative aspiration to achieve in the modern 
world. A more forceful and invigorating instance of the agitation for equality is the present 
saga staged by the women’s movement. Interestingly, the feminist movement also owes a 
vital part of its history to the demands of the French Revolution. Reconstructing sexual 
equality is the reigning concept that feminists all over the world are known for. Even though 
opinions are divided in the feminist camp as to whether equality or justice should be the main 
pre-occupation of the women’s movement, it is a fact that equality is a prominent agenda. 
156 Idowu William 
Also prominent is the emerging body of literature called post-colonial studies, which 
challenges the relics of colonialism that place the various races in a hierarchy, thereby 
undermining equality of human nature. 
The difficulty of equality in relation to citizenship can be demonstrated in several ways. In 
the first place, the definition of equality in socio-political discourses is evidently 
controversial. Some, like Rees (1971) say equality is a pointer to justice; others, like Tawney 
(1952) say equality is the satisfaction of the sentiments of justice, a protest ideal par 
excellence (Sartori 1987,  337); while some like Ramaswamy (2003) opine that fairness is the 
index to equality. In his estimation, Gauba (2003, 331) equality is the complement to liberty. 
The list of conceptualizations of equality is endless. Secondly, facts in the universe show that 
nothing in it enjoys any semblance of equality. Appadorai (1968, 86) stated that inequality, 
not equality, is the most striking fact about human life. According to Tawney (1952, 47), the 
pursuit of equality is difficult because it is like swimming against the current. Thirdly, the 
concept is also difficult to put into practice because what constitutes the conditions for 
equality in some societies are the very conditions that explain inequality in others. Fourthly, 
just like the word citizenship, equality is also a recursive concept owing to the fact that its apt 
conceptualization depends on some other related terms such as justice, liberty, rights and 
freedom. 
While the pursuit of equality is a desirable one, history tends to show that the state of 
absolute equality is unachievable as long as human nature remains what it is. The strive 
toward equality has been there since the beginning of human existence, but equality seems 
doomed to remain elusive and encoded in forlornness. It is in this sense that Barry (1995, 
187) sees equality as a prescriptive term rather than a descriptive one, suggesting that 
equality is not a feature of the universe at all. Equality, as a prescriptive term, only aims at 
protecting the possibility of a revolt against what is said to be interred as part of the universe. 
Dimensions of Equality: Implications on the Concept of Citizenship 
In what do philosophers see equality, and what illumination does that treatment provide on 
citizenship? Some assumptions are needed here. One is the correct assumption that the 
equality that philosophers often talk about is meaningfully associated with the existence of a 
political society. Outside a political society, people cannot be regarded as equal in anyway. It 
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follows that the principle of equality is fundamentally attached to a political society.3 For 
instance, Thomas Hobbes (1991) argued that men in the state of nature are not equal, and that 
it is only the creation of a political society that justifies the adoption of the principle of 
equality of all men. The second assumption is that within any political context, there must 
exist a contractual agreement outlining the basic tenets of equality. 
While the celebrated social contract is not a foul doctrine in the history of political thought, 
most contemporary political analysts prefer to enlist the modern idea of constitutions as a 
ground for the guarantee of the basic equality of all citizens. The existence of a constitution 
thus serves as an equalizing instrument, establishing the equality of the natural ability and the 
moral capacity to achieve preferred ends. It is supposed that this imbued ethical rationality 
sufficiently arms every person with mental and moral capacity to engage in what Locke calls 
reflective conscious decisions. According to MacCunn (1894, 4), this is what most religious 
people mean by the dictum that God created all men equally. 
The equality-inequality controversy, especially in its political context, is related to three main 
ideas: civil or legal equality, political equality and socio-economic equality. Let us briefly 
examine these three. 
Civil/Legal Equality 
The first is that every citizen is equal before the law, that is, all citizens are equals when it 
comes to obeying the law and in being judged by the law. This principle of legal equality is 
what Barker (1961) labeled as the state’s provision of equal masks in the definition of our 
personalities. Essentially, this view connotes the absence of discrimination in the application 
of the cutting edge of the law. What applies to A in connection with the law applies equally 
to B, especially where there is adjudicative similarity between both. In the words of Gauba 
                                                
3 A political society, according to John Austin, is one where there is a recognized sovereign and where members 
of that society pay habitual obedience to the sovereign so recognized. While this conception is eternally 
controversial, it, nevertheless, points attention to the fact that a truly political society is different from the 
Hobbesian state of nature. Thus, in spite of the weakness in the Austinian model, sovereignty both political and 
geographical defines a political society such that the principle of equality that is said to exists in a political 
society is attached to a situation where there is a sovereign or body of sovereign to enforce the principle so 
encoded. 
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(2003, 340), it means equal subjection of all citizens to the law and equal protection of the 
law for all citizens. 
However, there is a serious rebuttal to this view: the view suggests that under normal 
circumstances there is no preferential treatment among the members of a polity, but it is clear 
that this does not hold in practice. The question always is: whose law makes all citizens 
equal? What is the extent of citizens’ participation in the making of laws that govern them? 
The truth is that if all citizens participate effectively in law making, then, it would behove us 
to say that citizens do not have the right to undermine the integrity of the law through actions 
such as rallies and demonstrations. This is because it is reasonable to require that people be 
bound by laws that they have made either directly or indirectly. In this sense, protests can be 
viewed as immoral. Nevertheless, when citizens revolt, it appears clear that something 
injurious and inimical to societal progress is always involved. It is on record that most 
fundamental acts of revolt in the world initiated on account of citizenship concerns show that 
citizens are and have been sidelined in the process of making laws. Thus the idea of legal 
equality is fraught with obscurities. 
As Lucas (1976) pointed out, it is one thing to have equal access to the law, and another to be 
treated equally by the law. Even when it is claimed that we all have equal access to the law, 
which is not true anyway, the fundamental point is that citizens will never be treated equally 
before the law. This observation is important because law, even though often regarded as 
presenting a blind approach to issues, is actually a store house of certain preferences in the 
community. For example, a man who steals $50,000 is jailed for 6 months, whereas another 
who steals $50 million is jailed for 2 years. While it is true that both have been punished 
according to the law, it is evident that sound justice, an important principle in the expression 
of equality, has not been administered. Thus while the law may indeed punish offenders, it 
may not punish them according to deserts and what is just. This is why law may not entirely 
be seen as a neutral institution. 
A Marxist is bound to have problems with the view that law is an instrument of equality. This 
is because according to Marxism, law is an instrument of the ruling class, especially laws 
prohibiting violence and theft. For the Marxist, the reason why laws against theft are made is 
not because members of the ruling class see theft as intrinsically immoral, but because it 
safeguards their hold on property. Furthermore, judges who adjudicate on such matters, 
whose philosophy of life is determined by the prevailing social consciousness, will seek to 
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protect the said social consciousness by all means. The fraternalising philosophy turns out to 
be an ideology of legitimation - an attempt to sustain the status quo. Laski (1938) was apt in 
his recognition of this pertinent possibility when he remarked that “our judges are recruited 
from the ranks of successful lawyers, and, overwhelmingly, our system makes the successful 
lawyers a man who has spent the major part of his life in serving the interests of property.” 
While Marxist jurisprudence is open to criticism, it is difficult to gainsay the fact that law is 
not an innocent aspect of human society. Why must law, for instance, be the very instrument 
for the achievement of equality? My view is that it is often so because those who make law 
know the advantages it yields to them in the protection of their own selfish interests. 
Besides, to a feminist, law is a masculine institution which promotes patriarchy in human 
society. The state itself, for feminists, is a masculine institution. How, then, can law be an 
instrument for promoting equality when it is clear that certain preferences and interests are 
embedded in the nature of law? As a matter of fact, there is still an ongoing dispute between 
naturalists and positivists over the exact nature of law, and it is clear that the conception of 
equality that is bound to be ferreted out of both conceptions of law will be utterly different. 
Political Equality 
The notion of political equality is also vague, yet its main expression is contained in the 
popular ideology of free citizen participation in politics. The contradiction is immediately 
clear when we attempt to juxtapose the meaning of politics with the idea of political equality. 
While politics itself is an exclusivist activity since it deals with influencing, manipulating or 
controlling major groups so as to advance the purpose of some against the opposition of 
others, political equality, as expressible through political participation of all, is meant to 
connote a benign and convenient platform on which every citizen has a stake. 
According to Appadorai (1968, 88), political equality connotes the “conferment on all adult 
citizens of the right to vote and its corollaries, the right to stand as a candidate for election 
and equal eligibility for administrative and judicial post provided the necessary technical 
qualifications are fulfilled.” However, there are many conventions, beliefs and practices in 
many societies that indicate that political equality is mere rhetoric. For instance, in many 
societies, the idea of gender equality is still not acceptable. Even in those countries where 
women are very active in politics, it still has not settled the lingering question over whether 
both men and women are equal. This unsettled nature is of course likely to have an impact on 
our conception of political equality. 
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Moreover, the kind of technical qualifications that are placed on participation can be so 
crippling that one wonders whether they are not actually intended to disqualify large 
segments of society in the first instance. The way political decisions are made is contrary to 
Robert Dahl’s definition of political equality as giving equal considerations to the good or 
interests of each person (Dahl 1996, 639). Political decisions are made by certain individuals, 
and they are meant to be binding on the citizens whether they so wish or not. The Pension 
Act in Nigeria, for instance, was passed by the political class without the involvement of the 
citizenry, despite its strangulating impact. The same is true of the Privatization Act. 
Just recently, the National Assembly of Nigeria passed into law what it called the Electoral 
Act, which makes it illegal to remove a candidate from office who has already been sworn in, 
regardless of whether or not he or she won the election fraudulently. All these examples 
suggest that there is no political equality. Those who have power use it to create privileges 
for themselves. Street naming in major cities is done to honour those who are unduly 
privileged in society. Such ascriptions are defended by allusions to meritorious services done 
to the country, but it is apparent that social institutions are structured to favour some and to 
exclude others. In what then does political equality consist, except in mere use of words? In 
fact, the absence of true justice in the world shows that political equality is a ruse. The 
connection between justice and equality is easy to see, but it is evident that the prevailing 
social consciousness, dictated by political power and economic resources, renders as merely 
hypothetical the reasoning that all citizens in a political community are equal. 
Socio-Economic Equality 
The concept of socio-economic equality is another way by which the connection between 
citizenship and equality can be problematised. However, rather than illuminate our 
understanding, it further indicates that the idea of citizenship is a threatened concept. This is 
because citizenship has been unable to mitigate the rising effect of socio-economic inequality 
in our societies. To advance a theory of economic equality as a possibility in society is to 
ignore human nature, which is a complex phenomenon. The complexity was ably captured in 
David Hume’s observation that gross differences in human nature hinder economic equality. 
This is why, if economic equality is defined as equality of opportunity, equality of wealth,  
equality of the distribution of rights, privileges, benefits and rewards, etc., then such a pursuit 
is bound to be a wild goose chase. Not even Marx’s revolution can usher in such a state 
without a drastic change in human nature. The impossibility ingrained in this conception of 
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citizenship is what Bryan Turner (1990, 91) regarded as one of the most obvious 
shortcomings of T.H. Marshall’s analysis of citizenship.4 When Marshall defined citizenship 
as a status conferred by virtue of full membership and went on to divide citizenship into three 
parts, that division was faulty because it did not take care of the problem of economic 
inequality (Laski 1962).5 For example, countries are not equally endowed: some are very 
rich, some moderately so, while some are very poor. Even regions and states within some 
countries are not equally endowed. 
In sum, if citizenship is one of the ways by which the ideal of equality is to be realized, it has 
not been successful; and if equality is one way by which citizenship is to be characterised, 
such an attempt is a grand failure, since it is clear that equality is non-existent in the world. 
On both counts, then, it is obvious that citizenship is an endangered concept. 
Conclusion 
The history of citizenship is almost as old as the history of western philosophy itself; yet its 
controversial turn emerged within the context of critical discourse on the lingering 
uncertainty concerning the nature of welfarist policies, rights, the assertive nature of 
egalitarianism, and the modern renaissance of liberalism. Apart from the fact that the view of 
the ancient Athenians on citizenship was a response to public practice, Aristotle also put 
considerable intellectual effort into reflecting on the meaning and limits of citizenship. 
However, the manner in which the idea of citizenship was viewed in the works of ancient 
Greek thinkers is different from the way it is seen in our time. It appears that our age, which 
has given a generous dose of popularity to the concept of citizenship, has also presented 
several conditions for its demise. 
                                                
4 According to Turner (1990, 191), there exists a contradiction between the extension of franchise which is 
political equality and the persistence of extensive social and economic inequality grounded, of course, in the 
reverberating influence of capitalism characterized by the defense of the right to private property. 
5 Harold Laski (1962) argued that the weakness of T. H. Marshall’s analysis on citizenship especially the 
division of the elements of citizenship into three was principally rooted in the fact that the theory and analysis 
was founded on the individualism of English liberalism. A major problem with this brand of liberalism is the 
fact that it failed to address directly the problem of social inequality in relationship to individual freedoms. 
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The in-built conceptual difficulties generated by the idea of citizenship are enough to create 
doubt as to whether it will survive in our time. Besides, because citizenship is often tied to 
the existence of the state, those who have argued against the statist tradition also seem to lend 
credence to the argument that citizenship is increasingly becoming endangered. What is 
more, the challenges of multiculturalism and the elusiveness of equality are some of the 
grounds for the conclusion that citizenship is an endangered concept. 
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